Autonomy of the State and devepment in the democratic capitalism
Marcus Ianoni

State autonomy and development in democratic capitalism. The paper argues that if the state, as an expression and part of a pact of domination, operates as a corporate actor with relative autonomy, vision and capacity to promote the development, it is a key institution in the economic transformation. Supported in the neo-Marxism, exposes the limits of institutionalist approach of autonomy from the state to explain its origin, but does not rule out this approach. Maintains that the class-balance theory of the state may explain its relative autonomy and at the same time aid in understanding the historical experiences of social-developmental state action, particularly in the social democratic regimes and in Latin America current. 


Vol.33, n.o4(133), 2013
   
Interesses financeiros e captura do Estado no Brasil
Marcus Ianoni

 O trabalho explora a avaliação de Bresser-Pereira (2007) de que a política macroeconômica brasileira exprime a captura do Estado por uma coalizão de interesses rentistas e financistas, que também influencia a regulação financeira. Para tanto, analisa duas agências de relacionamento com investidores, do Banco Central e do Tesouro Nacional, e uma agência de promoção de investimentos formada por reguladores e regulados. Argumenta que essas agências estreitam a comunicação e canais de formulação de políticas entre reguladores e regulados; atestam a influência das instituições financeiras nas decisões de políticas públicas; e corporificam convergência de interesses entre investidores financeiros e Estado. Conclui avaliando que a tesa da captura da política macroeconômica é plausível e deve ser pesquisada de modo sistêmico.

 The work explores the evaluation of Bresser-Pereira (2007) of which the Brazilian macroeconomic policy expresses the capture of the State by a coalition of rentiers and financiers interests, which also influences financial regulation. To this end, analyzes two investor relations agencies, of the Central Bank and of the National Treasury, and an investment promotion agency formed by regulators and regulated. Argues that these agencies strengthen communication and policymaking channels between regulators and regulated; attest to the influence of financial institutions on public policy decisions; and carry convergence of interests among financial investors and State. Concludes by assessing the thesis of macroeconomic policy capture is feasible and should be researched in a systemic way.


Vol.37, n.o2(147), 2017
 
         
 
     
     
 
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